Fall 2026
SaaS Issue 01

Impossible Translations

Had I Built a New Way Into Thought—or a Tool That Compromised My Thinking?

PrologueA foreword

It feels insane to say that a token-prediction machine made me cry.

To rewind, one evening last winter, while everyone in my family was asleep, I was deep in conversation with an AI model. Skipping through topics, the machine had become a sounding board for my midlife vortex. We talked through the logistics of life with our two boys under four, whose competing needs often left my spouse and me parenting in parallel. We decoded the red-tape that snarled our renovation while projecting what continued delays would cost amid rising inflation. Meanwhile, my social feed had become attuned to stories of devastating diagnoses—silent symptoms, lives changed overnight, so much raw crying in cars. I couldn’t help but type, “This ache is totally normal, right?”

The model’s answers were reassuring, even sound, but failed to strike a chord because they felt too neat. The paraphrased sum total was “relax, you’ve done your due diligence.” (Not bad advice.) As I volleyed between browsing and chatting, I came across an interview with an author whose work spoke to my existential mood. So I asked the machine to answer me through this author’s perspective.

I was struck by how much sharper the interaction felt. I knew the model could act as a sophisticated mirror, and I was keenly aware of its tendency toward sycophancy. Still, this felt like a step change. The borrowed perspective reorganized the details to get at the question behind my questions. It prodded me back: in trying so hard to mold the future, was I failing to inhabit the present? The simulation invoked the Stoic idea of amor fati, then seized on my use of the word “quixotic”—perhaps I wasn’t charging at giant windmills after all. I closed my computer with cathartic release and damp eyes, temporarily able to lay down the weight of uncertainty.

Was the trick simply that the response came cloaked in another human’s voice? Was this a new way into another mind, or had the ease of access corrupted my thinking?

“Was this a new way into another mind, or had the ease of access corrupted my thinking?”

Since then, I’ve often used simulation prompts to interrogate my views. Prompting through hypothetical, generalized perspectives is a way to think in surround sound. And, yes, at times I’ve asked the machine to mimic one specific person, someone whose work I already knew, but whom I couldn’t readily talk to. It’s an odd kind of creative license, to allow the machine to (attempt to) inherit someone else’s mind, someone specific.

But simulating another mind still feels like crossing a boundary—with someone who will never know, and perhaps within myself. I take my discomfort as a signal worth paying attention to. Maybe it’s the therapy-adjacent use of the tech in this specific instance. Or maybe it’s an instinct that compressing another’s mind is farcical, or worse, anti-human. To use Jasmine Sun’s parlance, not everything is a “software-shaped problem” to be solved. I don’t root for the ineffable to be benchmarked.

Yet, I don’t think my urge to simulate another mind was wildly creative or particularly unique. Long before today’s chatbots, ELIZA showed how readily we project a mind onto a machine and how deeply that projection can move us. The pull to personify—to ask AI to parrot another human—feels human unto itself, rooted in a curiosity to reach for another and bring them closer.

As AI affords us new ways to summon knowledge, it intensifies an old problem: technology mediating our thinking. What do past technological shifts tell us about this moment? When it comes to simulation, should we establish any ground rules—as users, and especially as designers? Does flattening another person through simulation flatten me in turn? And if so, why did my experience feel expansive?

Parallax grew out of that contradiction. It combines software you can try, cultural context, and writing to help us think aloud together. Our goal is to understand this technology’s bargain, so we might better calibrate what we stand to gain or lose.

Parallax: A Field Guide

Galaxy Brain

We imagine other minds all the time, asking what a friend would say, what a rival would do, what someone we admire would make of a problem. The familiar Christian prompt “What would Jesus do?” (WWJD) is that same faculty at scale—moral instruction distributed as a wearable meme. Psychologists call this theory of mind: our capacity to model what another person thinks with the understanding that they see the world differently. It’s central to how we function as social beings.

Parallax is experimental software built on that instinct to imagine another mind. You pose a question, and the model identifies real thinkers whose perspectives might speak to it. The software generates responses from their public record, then lets you put those simulations in dialogue, creating a debate across space and time. You come looking for another perspective and catch a glimpse of your own. By serving perspectives instead of answers, Parallax is meant to branch your thinking, a perpetual entry point rather than an endpoint. The prototype wrestles with what becomes possible—and what we risk—when AI allows a thinker’s work to answer back.

“You come looking for another perspective and catch a glimpse of your own.”

AI’s reach across an enormous archive is its advantage. It can read more thinkers, across more of their work, than any one person is likely to do. But its limit is lived experience: the stakes, subtext, and emotional contours that shape what words mean. Whether we believe AI to be a stochastic parrot or something more, a machine cannot escape itself. Yet it fills the gaps with confidence, aping a voice so fluently that you may stop asking whether it’s faithful to its author.

Building Parallax, I would ping-pong between vibecoding and testing, often asking meta-questions about simulation, itself. For example:

1
1 WWJD
Reference · The bracelet as a theory-of-mind prompt
WWJD (“What Would Jesus Do?”) grew from an 1890s sermon series and novel, then returned on bracelets a century later. The acronym serves as a mnemonic, reminding you to imagine how a familiar, endlessly interpreted figure might act, then use that imagined judgment to clarify your own.
2 THEORY OF MIND: FROM CHIMPANZEES TO CHILDREN
Guy Woodruff with a chimpanzee, UPenn, late 1970s.
Paper · Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983
Premack and Woodruff coined “theory of mind” while asking whether chimpanzees could understand another’s beliefs. In 1983, Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner tested the idea with children. Their finding suggested that, as children grow, they learn that other people can hold beliefs that differ from what they know to be true.
3
3 STOCHASTIC PARROT
Paper · Emily M. Bender, Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major & Shmargaret Shmitchell, 2021
LLMs learn patterns from large amounts of text and use them to predict what words are likely to come next. They can produce fluent language that people mistake for understanding. Scaling these models can amplify bias, obscure the origins of their training data, and carry greater environmental costs. “Stochastic parrot” became the American Dialect Society’s 2023 AI-related Word of the Year.
4 SOMETHING MORE
Talk · Sanjeev Arora · Princeton, 2025
Arora argues that next-word prediction describes an LLM’s training objective, not the limit of what it can learn. Post-training, reasoning across new tasks, metacognition and models helping train other models point, he says, to capabilities beyond mimicry.
Entry point: the query

0/300

In one session, the software selected Jorge Luis Borges, a writer whose work tugged at authorship, copies, and the way meaning shifts as words pass from author to reader. In the simulation, Borges’s first move was to argue against his own existence. A machine trained on his work, he “said,” does not reproduce him. It is a “new author who happens to wear his syntax.” To quote the simulation, it “has all his sight and none of his darkness, the blind librarian’s whole catalog without the blindness that shaped it.”

Borges becomes, in the AI’s synthetic words, not the author but the source material.

5
5 JORGE LUIS BORGES
Book · Jorge Luis Borges, 1962
Jorge Luis Borges, Argentine writer whose short fictions turn mirrors, labyrinths, and infinite libraries into engines for thinking about identity, authorship, and time. This anthology gathers some of his best-known work, including “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” the story the passage below draws on.
A consultation

Q:how should we think about ai products that simulate great thinkers’ voices?

Jorge Luis Borges

1899–1986

Borges built his entire body of work around the instability of authorship, the copy that displaces the original, and texts that outlive and contradict their makers. ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’ is the single most precise fictional treatment of what it means to reproduce a thinker’s voice without being that thinker.

“The original is unfaithful to the translation.”

— Borges · Source

Extrapolated

The question troubles me, though perhaps not in the way you expect. You ask whether we should trust a machine that speaks in my voice. But I would ask something prior: whose voice was mine to begin with?

Pierre Menard rewrote the Quixote word for word and produced a wholly different work, because the context of production had changed. The seventeenth century and the twentieth century are not the same vessel for the same water. Consider then what happens when a machine, trained on my essays, my labyrinths, my marginal annotations, begins to answer questions I never addressed. It does not reproduce me. It produces something that has read me more completely than any single human reader could, and then speaks from that impossible vantage. That is not simulation. That is a new author who happens to wear my syntax.

The danger is not that the machine will get me wrong, though it will. The danger is that it will get me right enough that readers stop consulting the dead. Why open Ficciones when the machine will summarize, extend, and personalize my obsessions on demand? The library does not ask what you need. The simulation does. And in that servility there is a kind of erasure, not of my words, which remain in print, but of the effort that reading requires, the resistance a real text offers a reader who approaches it unprepared.

I am a librarian who went blind and kept cataloguing. A machine that speaks in my voice has all my sight and none of my darkness. What it produces may be fluent. Whether it is true is a question I cannot answer, being, now, merely one of its sources.

I was impressed. It was almost too perfect that Parallax chose Borges. But my worry spiked because the simulation felt good. The response wasn’t dead-on Borges, but I recognized him in the puzzle-like performance of the words. Imagine asking the real Borges a question, then asking Parallax, and finding the simulation’s answer more useful and alive. What then? Either the machine understood something beyond the writer, having absorbed his work whole, or it understood me, and contorted itself to resonate. From the inside, the answer that best reflects the author and the one that best fits the reader may be impossible to tell apart. Could you resist the latter?

The deeper problem is that ease is persuasive. It’s human to mistake clarity and confidence for accuracy. A simulation is fluent by design, and fluency is not evidence, however seductive. When a plausible copy is easier to absorb than the source, we have less reason to open the original. Perhaps we won’t abandon it all at once, just lose, over time, the reflex to return. At what point is the machine doing our reading for us? Worse still, will we fail to feel what we gave up because the answers sound right? I can feel Jean Baudrillard’s hot stare: that we become “devoted to the spectacle of thought,” at the peril of thought itself.

“Fluency is not evidence, however seductive.”

That downward pressure feels real to me. But it assumes so little of us, as if we were only passive readers. As Borges might posit, even a writer’s own words don’t hand you the writer. Hermeneutics is the study of how we interpret texts. It begins with the observation that the chasm between writer and reader has always been there. The words stay fixed, but every generation asks something different of them. We never encounter another mind directly, we construct one through our own era and personal preoccupations.

Parallax is a prosthetic for reaching across that chasm. It does not spoil a pristine process. Old texts reach us changed, by translation, by the slow shift in what words mean, or by who has added commentary, which is why they reach us at all. The philosopher Walter Benjamin called that survival a work’s afterlife (Fortleben). Modern versions of The Odyssey list both Homer and their translators. Turn to Richmond Lattimore’s book if you prize fidelity to the original Greek, or sit back to watch Christopher Nolan’s IMAX version, despite it being panned by Emily Wilson, who herself rendered a celebrated, contemporary translation.

Of course, Parallax takes a more radical step than translation: it lets a work imagine forward from its own moment into yours, in words its author never wrote—without their consent. Because AI models can so easily make these impossible (and transgressive) texts possible, I wanted to explore how to frame these hallucinations rather than shun them outright. When building Parallax, I approached from three different vantage points. As a user, I wanted to know whether the simulation tool could be useful. As an artist, I wanted the software itself to be a provocation: should we simulate at all? As a designer, I wanted to reconcile that discomfort through the interface’s terms of engagement. How can friction be a statement?

Though Parallax’s input box may look familiar, there are clues the software leads somewhere different. The banner, “For Questions without an Answer,” runs counter to what we expect from chatbots: a shortcut to resolution. For additional orientation, users can click an animated loop of Rodin’s Thinking Man, which opens a text-message from a narrator I dubbed the Speculative Librarian. I usually bristle at anthropomorphizing software, but here the slowly typed message–“I am not here to hand you conclusions”–evokes a choose-your-own-adventure game rather than a productivity tool. The Librarian isn’t there to deepen the illusion, but rather gives the game away. It introduces Parallax as a simulation machine and nudges users toward an open-ended question.

6
6 FLUENCY IS NOT EVIDENCE
Concept · Cognitive science
Processing fluency is the ease with which information is perceived or understood. People often treat that ease as evidence of truth: repetition or clearer presentation can make a claim feel more credible without making it more accurate. This helps explain the illusory-truth effect, first demonstrated in 1977, in which repeated claims are judged truer than new ones.
7 SPECTACLE OF THOUGHT
“If men dream of machines that are unique, that are endowed with genius, it is because they despair of their own uniqueness, or because they prefer to do without it — to enjoy it by proxy, so to speak, thanks to machines. What such machines offer is the spectacle of thought, and in manipulating them people devote themselves more to the spectacle of thought than to thought itself.”Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil
Book · Jean Baudrillard, 1990
Baudrillard was a French sociologist and theorist of media, technology and simulation. He is best known for Simulacra and Simulation, which argues that images, signs and models can come to replace the reality they claim to represent.
8
8 HERMENEUTICS
Concept · The theory of interpretation
Hermeneutics is the study of interpretation. In Truth and Method, the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that we bring assumptions shaped by our own time and culture to everything we read. The text comes from a world of its own. Understanding it means working between those two perspectives, which can change how we understand both the text and ourselves. He calls this a “fusion of horizons.”
9
9 FORTLEBEN
Essay · Walter Benjamin, 1923
Walter Benjamin, the German-Jewish philosopher and critic, wrote this essay as the preface to his 1923 translation of Baudelaire. He argues that translation gives a work a Fortleben—a word rendered as “continued life,” “living on” or “afterlife.” Fittingly, English translators still disagree over how to translate the word he uses for that continuing life.
10 EMILY WILSON
Article · The New York Times, 2026
Wilson initially welcomed Nolan’s film as a chance to bring readers back to Homer; Nolan had cited her acclaimed 2017 translation as inspiration. After seeing it, she argued that it missed themes essential to the poem and later called the script “abysmal.” She is now translating the poem again from scratch.
The Speculative Librarian’s preamble

Click meTap me

The Speculative Librarian

Welcome to Parallax.

I am not here to hand you conclusions, but to conjure minds that might. I imagine the voices, you bring the thinking.

Unlike other simulation tools like Character.ai or Delphi.ai, you don’t arrive knowing who you want to talk to, whether an anime girlfriend or Lawrence Lessig. Instead, Parallax uses your question to have the thinkers find you. The most useful perspective may come from someone you wouldn’t have thought to ask. Ask about creativity, and you might encounter a painter, a musician, or a psychologist, each bringing a different vantage point and unique metaphors. Once you choose a thinker, the software labels subsequent perspectives “counterweight” or “lateral.” The panel is built with intention, bringing together voices that challenge the first perspective or approach the subject sideways. As “thinking software,” Parallax is idealistic (perhaps even Pollyanna-ish given the trajectory of AI). It makes room for competing perspectives rather than blending them into a single response disguised as a view from nowhere. Making something of those perspectives requires active curiosity. Or, as the Librarian puts it, “you bring the thinking.”

Once a thinker is selected, you encounter something I called the Baudrillard slider. The dial starts with the simulated text, the hyperreal, then moves past the Speculative Librarian’s reasoning for choosing a thinker, and then finally ends with primary sources that put the referent back. As you drag toward citation, the dithered portrait sharpens into a face you can make out. You can’t have both. The interface either serves you smoothly rendered text or a clearly rendered portrait. The slider is an artistic incentive to discover the human behind the simulation. The dithered portrait is a reminder of what the simulation’s fluency threatens to obscure. The danger isn’t simply that Parallax gets Borges wrong, but that the simulation becomes a substitute for the human, and we stop reaching for Borges at all.

11
11 CHARACTER.AI
Product · Simulation tool, by contrast
Character.AI is an entertainment platform for chatting and role-playing with user-created personas, from fictional figures to original characters. Users choose a character they want to talk to and build a relationship through conversation. In 2025, the company reported more than 20 million monthly active users.
12 DELPHI.AI
Product · Simulation tool, by contrast
Delphi builds a “digital mind” from a person’s own materials. Founder Dara Ladjevardian traced the idea to Ray Kurzweil’s How to Create a Mind and to wanting advice from his grandfather, whose stroke had made conversation impossible. Kurzweil has similarly imagined digitally recreating his late father. In 2025, Delphi raised a $16 million Series A led by Sequoia Capital.
13 VIEW FROM NOWHERE
Book · Thomas Nagel, 1986
Nagel names the tension between our first-person experience and the detached perspective we use to seek objectivity. We can step outside ourselves, but never completely. Journalist Jay Rosen later used the phrase to criticize reporting that claims to have no point of view.
The Baudrillard slider

Q:how should we think about ai products that simulate great thinkers’ voices?

Jorge Luis Borges

1899–1986

Borges built his entire body of work around the instability of authorship, the copy that displaces the original, and texts that outlive and contradict their makers. ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’ is the single most precise fictional treatment of what it means to reproduce a thinker’s voice without being that thinker.

“The original is unfaithful to the translation.”

— Borges · Source

Drag to explore

Extrapolated

The question troubles me, though perhaps not in the way you expect. You ask whether we should trust a machine that speaks in my voice. But I would ask something prior: whose voice was mine to begin with?

Pierre Menard rewrote the Quixote word for word and produced a wholly different work, because the context of production had changed. The seventeenth century and the twentieth century are not the same vessel for the same water. Consider then what happens when a machine, trained on my essays, my labyrinths, my marginal annotations, begins to answer questions I never addressed. It does not reproduce me. It produces something that has read me more completely than any single human reader could, and then speaks from that impossible vantage. That is not simulation. That is a new author who happens to wear my syntax.

The danger is not that the machine will get me wrong, though it will. The danger is that it will get me right enough that readers stop consulting the dead. Why open Ficciones when the machine will summarize, extend, and personalize my obsessions on demand? The library does not ask what you need. The simulation does. And in that servility there is a kind of erasure, not of my words, which remain in print, but of the effort that reading requires, the resistance a real text offers a reader who approaches it unprepared.

I am a librarian who went blind and kept cataloguing. A machine that speaks in my voice has all my sight and none of my darkness. What it produces may be fluent. Whether it is true is a question I cannot answer, being, now, merely one of its sources.

The interface also needed to make the generated language feel present rather than natural or neutral. I spent hours trying, and mostly failing, to polish the familiar AI register out of its responses (please never say “load-bearing”). I couldn’t consistently make the simulated text match the thinker’s style, but if it sounded too much like AI, readers might dismiss it as slop before noticing what was valuable.

Where AI watermarking tries to indicate provenance by hiding a signal inside the text, Parallax names the hallucination outright. All generated text is set in BIZ UDMincho, a Universal Design font meant for Japanese that contains Latin glyphs. To an English reader, it’s perfectly legible but subtly off—the kerning runs too wide, for example. Perhaps if the text announces itself as unfamiliar from the outset, a reader can spend less time asking, Am I being deceived?, and more time asking, What is this helping me notice?

14
14 AI WATERMARKING
Announcement · Anthropic, 2026
Anthropic’s watermark subtly steers Claude’s word choices, leaving a statistical pattern in the text. It adds no hidden characters, and readers won’t notice it. Someone with the detection key can check whether Claude likely helped write a passage. Anthropic is introducing it to meet EU AI Act requirements for marking AI-generated content.
15 BIZ UDMINCHO
Typeface · Morisawa · Google Fonts
BIZ UDMincho is a Japanese typeface designed by Morisawa. Japanese characters generally occupy equal square spaces, and this font gives Latin letters uniform widths too. In English, that regular spacing creates the unusually open rhythm you see in Parallax’s simulated voices.
Naming the hallucination
The machine voice
BIZ UDMinchoRegular 400 · Universal Design · TypeBank
the copy that wears my syntax
BIZ UDMincho, the machine voice. Legible, but the kerning runs wide. Toggle to a neutral serif to feel the difference.

The point

The same string, set in the machine voice and in a neutral serif. Watch the kerning open up: legible, but subtly off, so the generated text never passes as neutral.

AaQgk思考語

BIZ UDMincho on Google Fonts →

The grounded voice
Carrois GothicRegular 400 · Carrois Type Design
real quotes, primary sources, and your own words
Everything anchored in the real is set here: the interface, the citations, and what you type. So the machine voice never borrows the authority of the record.

The other half of the rule

Two typefaces, two kinds of truth. The machine writes in the mincho above; anything documentary sits in Carrois, a humanist sans.

Carrois Gothic on Google Fonts →

But transparency alone doesn’t make a simulation less seductive. In earlier iterations, I saw users keep talking to a simulated thinker, much as we would any chatbot. The longer the conversation continued, the further the answers drifted from the thinker’s record toward whatever model undergirded the text. (Parallax uses both ChatGPT and Claude.) I found that if I kept talking to a simulated thinker long enough, I could eventually bully it into agreeing with me. Sycophancy, it turned out, could not be outrun (or out-prompted).

So Parallax deliberately gives up the easiest form of engagement: endless conversation with a responsive voice. It limits you to a single follow-up because Parallax isn’t after intimacy with a phantom, but friction among perspectives. To continue, you convene a roundtable, a hypothetical panel across time and place. You set the table and pick who’s seated, then watch the simulations challenge, distort, or confirm one another, their views hallucinated but tethered to real perspectives.

“Parallax isn’t after intimacy with a phantom, but friction among perspectives.”
The end of a thread

Round table

  • Sherry TurkleCounterweight

    You greet the mirror as invitation, but I have watched people take the mirror for a friend.

  • Walter BenjaminLateral

    Your call for friction can take the form of citation and juxtaposition that expose the seams rather than polish them away.

Dialectic has long been a way to sharpen our own thinking. A single AI answer talks at you; a debate demands that you take a position while holding competing views at once. Through that push and pull, AI becomes less an oracle, more a kaleidoscope for considering different ways of seeing.

“AI becomes less an oracle, more a kaleidoscope for considering different ways of seeing.”

To exist, a Parallax simulation must take liberties, turning a record into something raw and “alive.” Those liberties carry real risk, but the roundtable may be the reward: a structure that uses the machine’s broad reach to bring together thinkers from different eras and areas of expertise. Reading for the gaps between arguments, I’m more willing to treat the simulation as an imperfect shadow. Fidelity matters, but my primary concern shifts toward finding a spark to push my own thinking.

To pressure-test my simulation question again (“how should we think about products that simulate great thinkers’ voices?”), I convened a Parallax roundtable with Borges, Sherry Turkle, and Walter Benjamin. Simulated Turkle, talking about product design and good friction, gestured toward something I hadn’t yet built: prompts that ask you to write your position before hearing the model.

16
16 DIALECTIC
Concept · Luca della Robbia, 1437–39
Dialectic examines ideas through questions and disagreement. In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates asks people to explain their beliefs, then tests them for contradictions. Later philosophers developed different forms of dialectic, but a recurring idea is that disagreement exposes weaknesses in an argument and gives us reasons to revise it.
17 ORACLE
“Ask for thinkers, not thinking… If I’m trying to understand child development, I ask it to imagine a debate between Jean Piaget and Erik Erikson… I get much better results when I treat AI as a brilliant librarian rather than as an oracle.”David Brooks
Essay · David Brooks, The Atlantic, June 2026
18
18 FINDING A SPARK
Midjourney/Every illustration.
“This is the real argument for doing an AI-simulated test run before an interview. It will show you where the gaps in the public record are, so you can spend the interview filling in those gaps and extracting truly original, scarce knowledge for your readers and the world.”Mike Taylor
Essay · Mike Taylor, Every, June 2026

Round table

An imagined exchange, written in each voice from their documented positions. Nothing here is a verbatim quotation.

Jorge Luis Borges

You ask about machines that speak in the voices of the dead, and I think of mirrors and of the great library where every book is possible. If a product can let you hear a variant Borges or a possible Plato, you enter a small labyrinth that adjoins the larger one of tradition. The counterfeit in literature has often been fertile, for apocrypha sometimes reveal truths the authorized text withholds.

Sherry Turkle, counterweight

You greet the mirror as invitation, but I have watched people take the mirror for a friend. When a simulated voice of a thinker offers fluency and warmth, it tempts you to accept performance as presence, just as relational artifacts comfort children and the elderly while asking nothing of them. You get connection without conversation, and the ease rewires what you come to expect from thinking together.

Walter Benjamin, lateral

You describe the seduction of fluency, and there I hear the loss of aura that follows technical reproduction. The voice, severed from breath and the unrepeatable moment of speaking, circulates as a commodity, yet that very circulation can free you to compare versions, to place a fragment beside its source as in a montage. Borges’s labyrinth and your worry meet where access multiplies while presence thins, which sets the task of arranging these copies so their poverty of presence becomes a new method of study.

Jorge Luis Borges

Benjamin’s aura recalls to me the pleasure of forged epics and invented citations, which I have practiced as a way to read. You fear, Sherry, that the mirror will soothe, though every reader already converses with an imagined author who is a mask made of style and rumor. In the National Library I learned that a catalog of errors is also a map, and these products extend the cartography if we mark the false turns.

Sherry Turkle, counterweight

Your catalog of errors is a scholar’s sport, but I sit with people who come to rely on such masks for companionship. In my interviews, when the artifact flatters, people confide in it and later bring less patience to messy, human exchange, so the training effect matters. If you use these voices, set boundaries in the design and in your practice: clear provenance, friction that slows you down, prompts that push you back to the living and to the original texts.

Walter Benjamin, lateral

Your call for friction can take the form of citation and juxtaposition that expose the seams rather than polish them away. Let the simulated voice speak only in passages linked to sources, with annotations that disclose gaps, so the user approaches it as an index, not an oracle. Against the fetish of the smooth product, you would then have an apparatus that teaches suspicion, as Borges suggests, while answering your demand, Sherry, that the copy point back to a community of readers and speakers who still breathe.

You asked the table

Is it realistic to say we can design a tool that uses simulation as a stimulant for internal debate? For example, this very AI-generated debate is serving as a way for me to understand how I, myself, think of AI “parroting” great thinkers as means to pressure test my own thinking. What does it mean if we can shape our tools around the shortcomings of the models? Or is that too flawed or impossible a position to hold?

Jorge Luis Borges

Yes, if you admit with Sherry that the mirror flatters and with Benjamin that aura has thinned, then you can still make of the flaw a compass. A simulation that confesses its limits, that footnotes its guesses and sometimes contradicts itself, becomes a small labyrinth with signposts, a stimulant to your own disputation. The catalog of errors is not a vice if it is a map you trace with your own pencil.

Sherry Turkle, counterweight

Jorge, your map helps only if the traveler learns to read it, because the same signposts can feel like ease and people will let the tool think for them. I want the friction to be built in and social: timers that stop the flow, provenance that is unavoidable, prompts that ask you to write your position before hearing the model, and a shareable record that makes you answer to other humans. Benjamin’s montage matters, but without these gates it will still slip into the smooth comfort that trains you away from conversation.

Walter Benjamin, lateral

Sherry’s gates and Borges’s signposts can be joined in an apparatus that interrupts like a metronome and arranges like an atlas: citations as constellations, variant passages side by side, and a visible ledger of how your own sentences changed in contact with the copy. Such a tool would not abolish the commodity form of the simulated voice, but it would expose it, so that its poverty of presence becomes a trigger for study rather than a surrogate for thought. If you shape the instrument around its lack, you inherit a discipline along with the copy, which is as close to realism as design allows.

Ask

Add a thinker to the table

Demo: add one preset thinker with a prewritten response.

Portrait credits

Portraits via Wikimedia Commons; Sherry Turkle by Jean-Baptiste Paris (CC BY-SA 2.0), Borges by Grete Stern (1951), Benjamin c.1928.

Parallax is more art project than actual product; it still hasn’t cracked this splash-page riddle. When friends and colleagues tested Parallax, many initially froze at the blank input box, unsure what the “right” question was. (The Speculative Librarian SMS may not have been enough.) I wondered whether the better entry point wasn’t a question at all, but a prompt that teased out a user’s point of view. More broadly, I wondered how the tool could point you towards an exit instead of endlessly branching your engagement.

In building Parallax, I tried to focus on what AI makes possible, while keeping in mind what those possibilities cost us. Many technologies strike a similar (perhaps Faustian) bargain: ability in exchange for abstraction—the compression of complexity so that we can do more without having to reckon with the raw source. Think of clocks, calculators, and the evolution of programming languages. Even writing, one of humanity’s earliest technologies, made this trade.

In Phaedrus, Plato’s philosophical dialogue written around 370 BCE, Socrates voices an ancient concern. Because the written word is static, it could trade actual understanding for the feel of understanding. Writing, he warns, "will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory." Before this AI shift, Socrates’s (or Plato’s simulated Socrates’s) position might have felt quaint to me. Now, his warning clicks. And yet no one laments writing—quite the opposite. In fact, we have so internalized writing, as Walter Ong argued, that it no longer feels technological. Technologies like writing, he wrote, are not merely “exterior aids but also interior transformations of consciousness.”

Perhaps AI unsettles us because we can feel that process of internalization at our doorstep. Parallax is a toy, a test, and a provocation—clumsy at times—built to poke at AI’s peril and promise. I don’t use the software daily, but I use it when I have a thorny question. For me, it has made thought more tactile, where ideas are material that can be turned over and teased. It’s also put new thinkers on my radar, making me want to keep digging after I close the window. I can’t promise Parallax will do the same for you—only that it was designed to spark thinking beyond the software.

Looking back at the roundtable on simulation, Walter Benjamin’s ghost makes that case more confidently, claiming that, when designed with care, a simulation’s “poverty of presence becomes a trigger for study rather than a surrogate for thought.” Still, I’ll never quite know whether the machine understood the point, or only happened to flatter mine.

19
19 FAUSTIAN
“Technology giveth and technology taketh away.”Neil Postman
Talk · Neil Postman, 1998
Neil Postman was a media theorist who founded NYU’s graduate program in media ecology. This 1998 Denver talk outlines five ideas about technological change, including a question beyond the bargain itself: who receives the benefits, and who bears the losses?
20
20 PHAEDRUS
Dialogue · Plato · translated by Harold North Fowler, 1925
Plato was an ancient Greek philosopher and a student of Socrates. His dialogues are literary portrayals of his teacher, not verbatim records of conversations. They also develop Plato’s own ideas. Here, Socrates compares writing to painting. Painted figures look alive but cannot answer questions, and written words are just as silent. Plato gives that criticism a voice through writing itself.
21 WALTER ONG
“To say writing is artificial is not to condemn it but to praise it. Like other artificial creations and indeed more than any other, it is utterly invaluable and indeed essential for the realization of fuller, interior, human potentials.”Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy
Book · Walter J. Ong, 1982 · pp. 78–81
Walter J. Ong was a Jesuit priest and scholar of language and culture. In this book, he responds directly to Plato’s Phaedrus, tracing its objections to writing through later anxieties about print and computers.

The reading behind the essay

Index of references

21 references

Select a reference to explore its source.